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Lane: On Madison, Muslims, and the New York City Police Department

ON MADISON, MUSLIMS, AND THE NEW YORK
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
Eric Lane*
"News" signifies something which has just happened, and which is new
just because it deviates from the old and regular. But its meaning
depends upon relation to what it imports, to what its social
consequences are. This import cannot be determined unless the new is
placed in relation to the old, to what has happened and been integrated
into the course of events.
- John Dewey'
I.

INTRODUCTION

An exchange of letters between James Madison and Thomas
Jefferson frames this Article. In October of 1787, Madison, the
intellectual and political force behind the successful adoption of the
Constitution in September of that year, had forwarded a copy of the
newly proposed document to Jefferson, who was then serving in Paris as
America's Minister to France.2 Jefferson's reply was immediate. While
mostly complimentary, he was highly critical of the absence of a bill of

* Eric Lane is the Interim Dean and Eric J. Schmertz Distinguished Professor of Public Law
and Public Service at the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University. The author wishes
to thank Faiza Patel of the Brennan Center for Justice for her comments on an earlier draft of this
Article and his research assistant, Rebecca Richards, for all her really fine work.
I. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 179-80 (Swallow Press 1954) (1927).
2. ERIC LANE & MICHAEL ORESKES, THE GENIUS OF AMERICA: HOW THE CONSTITUTION
SAVED OUR COUNTRY-AND WHY IT CAN AGAIN 54 (2007) (explaining Madison's significance to
the constitutional convention); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY
REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at 67 (2009) (describing Madison's stature as an intellectual politician);
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON: 7 AUGUST 1787 TO 31 MARCH 1788, at 271 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955) [full collection
hereinafter 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON]; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 438.
3. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 2, at 438-39 (acknowledging recent receipt of Madison's
letters).
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rights. 4 "[A] bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every
government on earth, general or particular, and what no just government
should refuse," he wrote.5 In fact, not only did the proposed constitution
fail to include a bill of rights, the subject itself had barely been discussed
by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention.6 It was raised only at
the end of the Convention by Virginia's George Mason and was then
unanimously defeated by the represented states.7
While Madison did not receive Jefferson's December 1787
response until July 1788,8 it is clear that by the beginning of 1788,
Madison and other Federalists recognized that the absence of a bill of
rights provided the Anti-Federalist delegates with a powerful argument
against ratification. 9 To counter this claim, the Federalist delegates
(including the Virginia delegate Madison), in state convention after state
convention, agreed to support a bill of rights as an amendment to the
Constitution, if it was ratified."'
But this alone did not satisfy Madison. He still wanted to explain
his initial reluctance to include a bill of rights within the Constitution. In
October 1788, several months after the ratification campaign had been
successfully completed, he responded to Jefferson's earlier letter.11 His
reasons were several, but most relevant to this discussion was his
judgment both from his study of history and from his experience as a
political actor that the enumeration of rights was but a "parchment
barrier[]" that could be violated at any time by "overbearing
majorities."' 2 From Madison's perspective, the real protection of
Americans' freedom was the limited powers given to the federal
government and the system of checks and balances the new Constitution

4. See id.at 439-40 (conveying Jefferson's critique of the Constitution); see also WOOD,
supra note 2, at 67 (noting that while Jefferson "was not unsympathetic to the new Constitution," he
took issue with the lack of a bill of rights).
5. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 2, at 440.

6. See WOOD, supra note 2, at 66.
7. Id.
8.

PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, at

443 (2010).
9. See LANE & ORESKES, supranote 2, at 86-87, 92; WOOD, supra note 2, at 66-67.
10. LANE & ORESKES, supra note 2, at 95; MAIER, supra note 8, at 443; WOOD, supranote 2,
at 67-68.
11. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 8 OCTOBER 1788 TO 26 MARCH 1789, at 16 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958) [full
collection hereinafter 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON]; LANE & ORESKES, supra note 2, at
96; MAIER, supranote 8, at 444.

12.

Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 THE PAPERS OF

THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 11, at 18-19.
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contained. 13 If those safeguards
failed, a bill of rights, he wrote, would
4
prove no safe harbor:'
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of
oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of
the Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be
apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its
constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere
instrument of the major number of the constituents. This is a truth of
great importance, but not yet sufficiently attended to ....Wherever
there is an interest and power to do wrong, wrong will generally be
done, and not less readily by a 5owerfiil and interested party than by a
powerful and interested prince.
Last year, in the week leading up to the tenth anniversary of
September 11, 2001 ("9/11"), news came of a possible terrorist car bomb
attack aimed at New York City or Washington, D.C. 16 Law enforcement
agencies characterized the report as "credible" and "specific," but
"unconfirmed." 17 This characterization suggested that the source was
someone trusted and that the report described both the mode and
locations of the attack, but that the information itself was hearsay and
thus unconfirmed. 18
As the news spread to New York City, so too spread the efforts of
the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") to prevent any such
tragedy. Squads of police raced throughout the city as a warning to
potential terrorists or perhaps terrorists on actual missions.' 9 Police boats
filled the city's rivers and police helicopters filled its skies. 20 And at its
13.

See MAIER, supra note 8, at 446.

14. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 11, at 18-20; see also MAIER, supra note 8, at 444-45.
15. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 11, at 19. This view was also shared by Alexander
Hamilton:
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the
ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction
of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of
continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and
security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights.
To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free.
The Federalist No. 8, at 34 (Alexander Hamilton) (ABA ed., 2009).
16. Al Baker & Scott Shane, Sweeping Security Effort Plannedfor 9/11Events, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11,2011,at A17.
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
17. Scott Shane, Investigators Assess Threat of Attack Tied to 9/11,
2011, at A15.
18. See Baker & Shane, supra note 16, at A17.
19. See id.
20. Id.
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tunnels, bridges, and other ports of entry, heavily armed police stood
watch, occasionally checking incoming vehicles for explosives. 21 All of
this was, as intended, highly visible to New Yorkers, the city's many
commercial or recreational visitors, and potential terrorists.
Beneath this surface, the news also spurred the increased
surveillance of New York City's more than 600,000 Muslims. 22 For the
New York City police officers, these communities are presumed to be, at
the least, likely hiding places for terrorists acting in the name of Islam
or, at worst, the places in which they live and from which they may
receive support and succor.23
The NYPD did not publicly announce this particular policing
operational
strategy. 244 Surveillance demands such secrecy both for its
26
efficiencies

25

and, in a case such as this, to avoid criticism.

Since 9/11, the NYPD has dramatically, and understandably,
directed its attention, energy, and considerable resources to preventing a
recurrence of a similar terrorist attack.2 7 But they have done so
effectively by staking out New York's Muslim communities. 28 NYPD
Commissioner Raymond Kelly himself has declared:
We want to know how individuals traveling here to do us harm might
communicate and conceal themselves. We must be able to quickly
pinpoint the likely areas in which a foreign operative might find
resources, or evade law enforcement. What interet caf6 in which

21. See id.
22. See MITCHELL D. SILBER &
RADICALIZATION

IN THE

WEST:

THE

ARVIN BHATT, NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIVISION,
HOMEGROWN THREAT 69 (2007), available at

http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/publicinformation/NYPDReport-Radicalization-in
the West.pdf; Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, Documents Show NY Police Watched Devout
Muslims, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 6, 2011 [hereinafter NY Police Watched Devout Muslims],
http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/201 I/Documents-show-NY-policeavailable at
watched-devout-Muslims.
23.

See SILBER & BHATT, supranote 22, at 24, 69.

24. See Joseph Goldstein, City Council Grills Kelly on Police Surveillance of Muslims, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2011, at A23.
25. See, e.g., Oversight - Safety in NYC Ten Years After 9-11: Hearing Before Comm. on
Pub. Safety, 2011 N.Y. City Council 24 (Oct. 6, 2011) [hereinafter N.Y.C. Public Safety Hearing]
(statement of Raymond Kelly, Comm'r of the New York City Police Department), available at
http://lcgistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=984766&GUID=C6F59E3A- 12DE-4C999A82-9E53C83719A5.
26. See Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, With CIA Help, NYPD Moves Covertly in Muslim
Areas, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 23, 2011 [hereinafter NYPD Moves Covertly], available at
http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-in-the-News/201 l/With-CIA-help-NYPD-moves-covertly-inMuslim-areas.
27. See N.Y C. Public Safety Hearing,supra note 25, at 6, 10 (statement of Raymond Kelly,
Comm'r of the New York City Police Department).
28. See, e.g., NY Police Watched Devout Muslims, supra note 22.
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borough would they be likely to use?
29 At which SRO [single room
occupancy] might they find lodging?

In that same testimony, he added that, "[h]aving a comprehensive
understanding of the communities we serve enhances our ability to
disrupt drug dealing, human trafficking, organized crime, fraud and
other complex criminal
activities. Why wouldn't we do the same to
30
combat terrorism?

II. COMPREHENSIVE POLICING AND EXAMPLES OF
ITS HISTORICAL CONSEQUENCES

The term "comprehensive" should give pause. Of course, good
policing practices should include a police force knowledgeable of, and
connected to, all of its jurisdiction's communities. 3' But history warns
that, in law enforcement lexicon, "comprehensive" means gathering as
much information as possible without particular regard to constitutional
limits. 32 This should not be surprising. While in principle the police are
committed to the protection of constitutional rights,33 in reality they win
their merit badges for preventing and fighting crime.34 That is why the
Supreme Court has limited police activity through such decisions as
Mapp v. Ohio35 and Miranda v. Arizona.36 As Jerome Skolnick has

written:
The policeman views criminal procedure with the administrative bias
of the craftsman, a prejudice contradictory to due process of law. That
is, the policeman tends to emphasize his own expertness and

29. N.Y.C. Public Safety Hearing,supranote 25, at 25 (statement of Raymond Kelly, Comm'r
of the New York City Police Department).
30. Id. at 25-26.
31. See David Alan Sklansky, The Persistent Pull of Police Professionalism, NEW
PERSPECTIVES IN POLICING, Mar. 2011, at 5, available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/
storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-programs/programs/crimina-justice/ExeSessionPolicing/NPIPThePersistentPullofPoliceProfessionalism-03-11 .pdf.
32. See, e.g., Editorial, Police Powers in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2012, at SRI0
[hereinafter Police Powers] (commenting on Attorney General Holder's review of the New York
City Police Department's surveillance practices, including its monitoring of the Muslim community,
stop-and-frisk, and conduct at Occupy Wall Street).
33. See id. (implying, by commenting negatively on constitutionally suspect practices, that the
police are tasked with following the Constitution and the limits it imposes on them).
34. See Sklansky, supranote 31, at 4.
35. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Supreme Court held that under the Fourth Amendment, in
criminal prosecutions, unconstitutionally obtained evidence cannot be used to convict a defendant.
Id. at 657.
36. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Supreme Court held that in police interrogations, statements
obtained from defendants can only be admissible if the defendants have been given a full warning of
their constitutional rights. Id.at 458, 460-61,467.
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specialized abilities to make judgment about the measures to be
applied to apprehend "criminals," as well as the ability to estimate
accurately the guilt or innocence of suspects. He sees himself as a
craftsman, at his best, a master of his trade. As such, he feels he ought
to be free to employ the technique of his trade and the system ought to
provide regulation 3 contributing
to his freedom to improvise, rather
7
than constricting it.
This all-important commitment to craft becomes particularly acute
in a democracy, as Madison noted, when public stress over security is
high, as it has appropriately been in New York City at least since 9/11.38
Historical examples of public stress stimulating aggressive policing
practices that compromise civil liberties are many, but three are
particularly relevant to New York. The first was the 1942 decision to
authorize the relocation and internment of more than 110,000 West
Coast people of Japanese origin, over 70,000 of who were Japanese
Americans, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. 39 And this
occurred after the government had separately rounded up some 1000
Japanese residents whom they actually suspected of subversive
activities.4 0 According to the Supreme Court, the reason for the
relocation was that "there were disloyal members of that population,
whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly
ascertained." 41 That, at least, is what the government represented to the
Court.42 But, as the Justice Department later acknowledged, the Solicitor
General had lied.43 In fact, at the time of the Solicitor General's

argument, he was aware of information held by "the Federal
Communications Commission, the Department of the Navy, and the
Justice Department which directly contradicted" the "evidence" of
Japanese-American complicity that framed his argument and the Court's
decision. 44 "And to make matters worse, [the Solicitor General] relied on

37. JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC

SOCIETY 191 (1994).
38. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supranote 11, at 20-21; infra text accompanying notes 70-72.
39. See Allie Shay, Remembering 110,000 Japanese Americans Interned in the 1940s,
PUBLISHING THE LONG CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (Dec. 19, 2011), https://lcrm.lib.unc.edulblog/

index.php/201 1/12/19/remembering-I I0000-japanese-americans-intemed-in-the- 1940s/.
40. See

Alien Detention Center, THE

HISTORICAL

MUSEUM

AT

FORT MISSOULA,

http://www.fortmissoulamuseum.org/aliendetention.php (last visited July 27, 2012).
41. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943).
42. See id; Neal Katyal, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General's Mistakes During the
Japanese-American Internment
Cases,
U.S.
DEP'T
JUST.
(May
20,
2011),
http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/1346.
43. Katyal, supranote 42.
44. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1419 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Katyal, supra

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol40/iss3/4

6

Lane: On Madison, Muslims, and the New York City Police Department

2012]

ON MADISON, MUSLIMS, AND THE NYPD

695

gross generalizations about Japanese Americans, such as that they were
disloyal and motivated by 'racial solidarity. ' '45 This was untrue. In fact,
as concluded by The Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians, "[t]he broad historical causes that shaped these
decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political
leadership. '' 6 This emphasis on the failure of political leadership was
underscored in the 1984 decision that overturned the conviction of Fred
Korematsu, the Japanese American convicted of failing to relocate and
the defendant in the infamous Supreme Court decision, Korematsu v.
United States. 47 In the 1984 decision, the District Court reviewing the
conviction warned that in the face of "petty fears and prejudices that are
so easily aroused," political leaders, including the judiciary, "must be
prepared to exercise their authority to protect all citizens. ' 48
But political restraint is not such a simple matter in a democracy
where the concerns of the public are expected to be reflected in the
conduct of their elected officials and are often expressed in the views of
the courts.49 And the more intense public sentiment toward a particular
outcome, the more palatable that particular issue will become to an
elected official. That is, as Madison noted in a letter to Jefferson, an
inevitable weakness of democracy and a bill of rights.5 °
The other relevant examples of overzealous policing in times of
stress come first from the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"),
second from the New York State Police, and finally, from the NYPD
itself. The public's intense fear of communism during the Cold War and
onward, 51 and its fear of the various other polarizing movements of the
note 42.
45.

Katyal, supranote 42.

46. COMM'N ON WARTIME RELOCATION & INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PersonalJustice
Denied Part 2: Recommendations 5 (1983), in REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME
RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED. The Commission was

established in 1980 by an Act of Congress to "review the facts and circumstances surrounding
Executive Order Numbered 9066" and its impact "on American citizens and permanent resident
aliens;" to "review directives of United States military forces requiring the relocation and, in some
cases, detention in internment camps of American citizens," including those of Japanese ancestry;
and to "recommend appropriate remedies." Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of
Civilians Act, Pub. L. No. 96-317, § 2(b), 94 Stat. 964 (1980) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 1981 (2006)).
47. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The District Court that vacated the Supreme Court's original
decision upholding Fred Korematsu's conviction pointed to the ethical failure of the government in
its intentional suppression of evidence as an example of a failure of leadership. Korematsu, 584 F.
Supp. at 1419-20.
48. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420.
49. See LANE & ORESKES, supra note 2, at 51-53.
50. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 11, at 19-20.
51.

FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ JR. & AZIZ A. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED:
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1960s and 1970s (anti-war, civil rights, black power, feminist, and prochoice and pro-life),52 spurred all levels of law enforcement agencies
throughout the country to aggressively, and sometimes illegally, collect
information on significant numbers of law abiding Americans whom the
police judged to be subversive or potentially subversive. 53 As the Senate
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities ("Church Committee") concluded with respect to
the surveillance efforts of the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency
("CIA"), and the National Security Agency ("NSA"), these efforts were
often "illegal, improper or unethical" and did not reflect "the ideals
which have given the people of this country and of the world hope for a
better, fuller, fairer life."54 Nor were these efforts "governed and
principles of our
controlled in accord with the fundamental
55
constitutional system of government.,
Closer to home and emphasizing the relationship between the
security concerns of the public and the corresponding responses of law
enforcement agencies were the far overreaching efforts of the N.Y. State
Police and the NYPD to spy on law-abiding New Yorkers whom the
police had defined as subversives.56
In New York State, this effort was revealed in the more than
500,000 files that the State Police maintained on several hundred
thousand law-abiding New Yorkers whom the police themselves
characterized as "non-criminal."57 To the police, these New Yorkers
were "subversives" because they "espouse[d] ideas which challenged the
status quo.58 Responsibility for these efforts belonged to the Special
Services Unit of the State Police, whose broad mandate for gathering,
recording, analyzing, and disseminating information resulted in "[t]he

PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 13 (2007). Frederick A.O. Schwarz Jr. served as Chief

Counsel to the Church Committee. Frederick A.O. ("Fritz") Schwarz, Jr., BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, http://www.brennancenter.org/people/frederick-a o-schwarzjr (last visited July 27,
2012).
52. SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 51, at 6; see Eric Lane, Political Surveillance in New
York-An Administrative Challenge to Democratic Values, 55 U. DETROIT J.URBAN L. 1079, 1082
(1978).
53. See SCHWARZ & HUQ, supranote 51, at 15-16, 22.

54. Id.at 23 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id.
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Lane, supra note 52, at 1082-83.
57. See SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON STATE POLICE NON-CRIMINAL FILES, N.Y. ASSEMBLY,
STATE POLICE SURVEILLANCE: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON STATE POLICE NONCRIMINAL FILES, at i, 1 (1977).

58. See id. at 7, 47.
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indiscriminate application of criminal investigative techniques to noncriminal matters. 59
Again it was the times, according to the New York Report that
detailed these law enforcement methods, that pushed such police
activity:
We believe that ...the overzealousness of the Police in conducting
their investigations was due partially to the tenor of the 1960's and to
external and internal pressures upon the State Police. In the sense that
there were scores of demonstrations, marches, sit-ins and racial
disturbances, it is understandable that Police agencies.., were deeply
concerned with keeping order. This concern with order created
pressure upon the Police from the Legislature, the Governor, the
of any
Criminal Justice System and from citizens, to be cognizant
60
jurisdiction.
their
within
occur
to
likely
was
that
disturbance
And in New York City, during this very same period and
responding to the same pressures "of heightened American public
,,61
the
awareness of political unrest and law enforcement response,
NYPD was similarly engaged in the "surreptitious surveillance and
undercover infiltration of the political activities of individuals and
groups. 6 2
III.

SURVEILLANCE, INTEL, AND THE MODIFIED

HANDSCHU

STANDARD

Whatever pressure the NYPD felt to ensure public safety during the
1960s pales in comparison to what they must currently feel in post-9/11
New York City. "September 11th forever changed how the NYPD views
its mission and the world around us," Police Commissioner Raymond
Kelly told the New York City Council's Committee on Public Safety at
a 2011 hearing, where he added, "[m]ore than any other place in the
world, New York City remains in the crosshairs of Al Qaeda and its
affiliated groups. 63
Since those attacks, multiple government officials have predicted
64
future attacks of one kind or another and jihadists have promised them.
59. Id.at 7, 48.
60. Id.at 46.
61. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div. (Handschu 11),
605 F. Supp. 1384, 1398 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
62. Id. at 1396 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
63. N.YC Public Safety Hearing, supra note 25, at 9, 21 (statement of Raymond Kelly,
Comm'r of the New York City Police Department).
64. See, e.g., David Johnston & James Risen, New Signs of Terror Not Evident, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 2003, at B1; David Johnston & David Stout, Bin Laden Is Said to Be Organizingfor a US.
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New Yorkers continue to believe that the city is a target for terrorists.65
A CBS News/New York Times Poll in 2006 found that 69% of New
Yorkers were "very concerned about another terrorist attack in New
York City," and 72% in this same poll also agreed that the federal
government had not "done all it could reasonably be expected to do to
make the country safe from future terrorist attacks. 6 6 Furthermore, 63%
of New Yorkers in this poll felt either "uneasy" with (47%), or "in
danger" from (16%), the prospect of future terrorists attacks.6 7
To protect New York and New Yorkers from future threats, the
NYPD has reorganized itself, effectively creating a freestanding
Intelligence Division that reports directly to the Commissioner.68 That
division includes a "Demographics Unit" for the purpose, in its own
and map[ping] ethnic residential
words, of "[i]dentify[ing]
concentrations within the Tri-State area," "[i]dentify[ing] and map[ping]
ethnic hot spots," and "[m]onitor[ing] current events and investigations
and puls[ing] the identified hot spots as appropriate., 69 To effectuate
these efforts, the NYPD employs both undercover agents and
informants. 70 A recently revealed demographic report on Newark, New
Jersey shows both the breadth and depth of the NYPD's surveillance
efforts.71 Using the census and other official and unofficial documents to
locate "the largest geographic population concentrations of people from
countries of concern," and then using "field work," the unit determined
and mapped "the major Locations of Concern. 72 Locations of Concern
are identified as, inter alia, a "[l]ocalized center of activity for a
particular ethnic group," "[llocation[s] that persons of concern may be

Attack, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2004, at Al; Richard W. Stevenson & Eric Lichtblau, As Ashcroft
Warns of Qaeda Plan to Attack U.S., Some Question the Threat and Its Timing, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 2004, at Al6; Massimo Calabresi, Warning: US. Unsure About Terror Threat, TIME (Oct. 4,
2010), http://swampland.time.com/2010/10/04/warning-u-s-unsure-about-terror-threat/.
65.

See CBS NEWS & N.Y. TIMES, FIVE YEARS AFTER THE 9/11 ATTACKS: ARE AMERICANS

SAFER? (2006), availableat http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/poll090606.pdf.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. N.Y.C. Public Safety Hearing, supra note 25, at 9-10 (statement of Raymond Kelly,
Comm'r of the New York City Police Department).
69.

DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, N.Y. POLICE DEP'T, THE DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, available at

http://wid.ap.org/documents/nypd-demo.pdf, see also Public Safety Hearing, supra note 25, at 49
(statement of Raymond Kelly, Comm'r of the New York City Police Department).
70. NYPD Moves Covertly, supra note 26.
71. See generally DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, N.Y. POLICE DEP'T, NEWARK, NEW JERSEY
(2007),
available at http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/
DEMOGRAPHICS
REPORT
documents/nypd/nypdnewark.pdf.

72. Id. at 3.
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attracted to," and "[l]ocation[s] that individuals may frequent to search
for ethnic companionship. 73
A.

Watching Muslims

The common denominator for each grouping of people investigated
by the Demographics Unit is the Muslim religion.74 It is only Muslims
who are being mapped and watched. This has been made clear by the
Pulitzer Prize-winning series of investigative reports by the Associated
Press ("AP") and by the documents released with these reports.75
Since August 2011, in dozens of articles, AP reporters have painted
the picture of communities whose public life is under constant police
watch.76 The NYPD has essentially "monitored every aspect of Muslim
life and built databases on where innocent Muslims eat, shop, work and
pray., 77 Mosques, work places, Intemet cafes, and bookstores are among
the many locations that have attracted NYPD attention,78 as have student
groups and individual Muslims who have "Americanized" their names.7 9
Muslim college students have been a special target of NYPD
surveillance. Not only have police undercover agents infiltrated student
groups at "Yale; Columbia; the University of Pennsylvania; Syracuse;
New York University; Clarkson University, the Newark and New
Brunswick campuses of Rutgers; and the State University of New York
campuses in Buffalo, Albany, Stony Brook and Potsdam; Queens
College, Baruch College, Brooklyn College and La Guardia Community
College," but one undercover agent went on a student rafting trip "where
80
he recorded students' names and.. . how many times they prayed."
The police have not denied these stories; indeed, they have
responded only by averring that, in their intelligence efforts, no laws
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., id. at 39, 48 (labeling a Muslim book store and a Halal restaurant as "Identified
Locations").
75.

See Highlights of AP's Pulitzer Prize-WinningProbe into NYPD Intelligence Operations,

ASSOCIATED PRESS, http://www.ap.org/media-center/nypd/investigation (last visited July 27, 2012).
76. See id.
77. Matt Apuzzo, NYPD-CIA Alliance's Authority Questioned, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 21,

2012,
available at
http://www.usatoday.com/USCP/PNl/NEWS/2012-01-21 -BCUSNYPDIntelligence3rd-LdWritethruSTU.htm.
78. See Eric W. Dolan, NYPD ProposedSpying on Muslims Based Solely on Their Religion,
THE RAW STORY (Feb. 2, 2012 17:51 EDT), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/02/02/nypdproposed-spying-on-muslims-based-solely-on-their-religion/.
79. Chris Hawley, NYPD Monitored Muslim Students, WASH. POST, FEB. 19, 2012, at A12;
Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, NYPD Keeps Files on Muslims Who Change Their Names,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 26, 2011, available at http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-ln-TheNews/201 1/NYPD-keeps-files-on-Muslims-who-change-their-names.
80. Hawlely, supranote 80.
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were broken. They are only "following leads," Commissioner Raymond
Kelly has continuously repeated. 81 "We go where the leads take us," he
told the Public Safety Committee of the New York City Council.8 2 And
if these leads take the NYPD into, for example, "religious institutions"
then "[w]e're not going to be deterred., 83 NYPD spokesman Paul
Browne, in the same vein, stated, "[w]e will go into a location, whether
it's a mosque or a bookstore, if the lead warrants it.
,84
The NYPD's definition of a "lead"-the threshold standard that is a
predicate for NYPD surveillance-is ambiguous.85 According to Kelly,
"a lead is information that indicates the possibility of unlawful
activity., 86 It would be hard for an explanation to ever explain less. For
example, in response to a question concerning the NYPD's predicate for
infiltrating student Muslim associations, Browne "provided a list of 12
people arrested or convicted on terrorism charges in the United States
and abroad who had once been members of Muslim student
associations . ,87 Of course, if an expectation of a similar outcome
was the only basis for an investigation, the NYPD could target every
student association in America.
B.

The Handschu Orders, Then andNow

The NYPD's claim that they are following leads only and not
monitoring particular religious groups is rooted in a number of judicial
decisions known as the Handschu Cases,88 which have resulted in the

81. N.Y C. Public Safety Hearing, supra note 25, at 24, 37, 53, 64 (statement of Raymond
Kelly, Comm'r of the New York City Police Department).
82. Id. at 24.
83. Id. at 40.
84. NYPD Moves Covertly, supranote 26.
85. See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div. (Handschu IV), 273 F. Supp. 2d 327, 331-32
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). The court noted that:
[w]hen specific information has been received by the Police Department that a
person or group engaged in political activity is engaged in, about to engage in or has
threatened to engage in conduct which constitutes a crime the [intelligence unit] is
authorized to commence an investigation of such person or group ....
Id. (quoting Handschu v. Special Servs. Div. (HandschuI1), 605 F. Supp. 1384, 1421 (S.D.N.Y.
1985)).
86. N.Y.C. Public Safety Hearing,supra note 25, at 57 (statement of Raymond Kelly, Comm'r
of the New York City Police Department).
87. Hawley, supra note 80.
88. Although there have been numerous Handschu decisions, four in particular are relevant to
this discussion: Handschu v. Special Servs. Div. (Handschu 1), 349 F. Supp. 766, 771 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss complaint); Handschu 11, 605 F. Supp. at 1417
(approving the settlement and the Handschu Guidelines); Handschu v. Special Servs. Div.
(Handschu I11), 787 F.2d 828, 831 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming the approval in Handschu I1); and
Handschu IV, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 349 (modifying the Handschu Guidelines).
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Handschu Stipulation of Settlement and the accompanying Handschu
Guidelines first approved by the court in 198589 and judicially modified
in 2003.90 Kelly himself makes this connection several times in his 2011
testimony before the Public Safety Committee of the City Council,
including his statement that "we follow leads that are authorized by the
Handschu Stipulation." 9' In response to questions about the AP stories
and the targeting of Muslims, Kelly repeated, "Again, we're following
the Handschu Guidelines. 9 2
Barbara Handschu and fifteen other plaintiffs brought a class action
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for injunctive relief against the Mayor of
the City, the NYPD Commissioner, other police officials, and the
NYPD's then-Special Services Division to halt various activities of the
department, including surveillance efforts that had "the effect of chilling,
discouraging and inhibiting plaintiffs ...from expressing and
advocating unpopular political and social views and from
93
communicating and associating with one another for that purpose."
Many of the alleged methods of surveillance were similar to those that
the NYPD has employed in performing surveillance of the Muslim
community,
such
as
the
use
of
"informers ...
infiltration.., interrogation... [and]
electronic
surveillance. 94
Additionally, "[t]his intelligence gathering was not limited to
investigations of crime, but related to any activity likely to result in a
serious police problem., 95 The conduct complained of was not the
lawfulness of the policing methods themselves, but among other things,
the excessiveness of such efforts, which the plaintiffs claimed deterred
them from joining or maintaining membership in their respective lawful
organizations. 96 The question presented was never answered by the
court.97 In 1985, in a new political climate and under a different
administration,98 the City of New York entered into a consent decree that
89. Handschu II,
605 F. Supp. at 1417-24.
90. Handschu IV, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 349-51.
91. N.YC. Public Safety Hearing,supra note 25, at 23-24, 53, 84-85 (statement of Raymond
Kelly, Comm'r of the New York City Police Department).
92. Id. at 59-60.
93. Handschu 1, 349 F. Supp. 766, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
94. Id.at 768; see NYPD Moves Covertly, supranote 26.
95. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384, 1396 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Handschu I1)
(citation omitted) (quoting the Affidavit of then-Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
96. See Handschu I, 349 F. Supp. at 767.
97. Id.at770-71.
98. Ed Koch was Mayor of New York City at the time of Handschu II, having been elected in
1978. Ed Koch, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ed-koch/ (last visited July 27,
2012).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2012

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:689

discontinued the action and created "an Authority to oversee the
activities of the PSS [Public Security Section] of the Intelligence
Division."99 The Handschu Authority was comprised of two police
administrators, including the Deputy Commissioner for Legal Affairs,
and one civilian chosen by the Mayor in consultation with the Police
Commissioner.'0 0 Under the terms of the agreement, only the PSS could
engage in "any investigation of political activity," and any such
investigation continuing for more than thirty days would require filing a
notice of investigation with "factual predicate" with the Authority and
obtaining the Authority's approval.10' The term "political activity" was
defined as "[t]he exercise of a right of expression or association for the
purpose of maintaining or changing governmental policies or social
conditions."' 02 And "investigation" was defined as "police activity
undertaken to obtain information or evidence."' 10 3 The NYPD also
needed to obtain approval from the Handschu Authority for use of
undercover agents in investigations of political activity.' °4 The entire
Handschu agreement is described and attached to Judge Charles
Haight's Memorandum Opinion and Order that was issued in 1985 for
Handschu v. Special Services Division.'05
After 9/11, the NYPD moved for an order modifying the original
order, arguing that enforcement of the Guidelines was no longer
consistent with the public interest because "they limit the effective
investigation of terrorism.' 1 6 The NYPD's proposal would have deleted
nearly all of the original provisions and would have only required that
the NYPD act in conformance with the Constitution. 10 7 More
specifically, the NYPD proposed that the Authority be stripped of its
role as gatekeeper to the initiation of investigations into political activity
and that the Authority's sole function be limited to performing reviews
of the PSS's records when requested to do so by an individual who
believes that he or she has been named in the PSS's records.10 8 Most
importantly, the NYPD proposed that the new order remove the

99.
100.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
omitted).
107.
1420-24.
108.

Handschu II, 605 F. Supp. at 1390, 1417.
Id.at 1390.

Id.
Id.at 1420.
Id.
Id.at1422.
Id.at 1417 app. A.
Handschu IV, 273 F. Supp. 2d 327, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (internal quotation marks
Compare Handschu IV, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 349-51, with Handschu 11, 605 F. Supp. at
See HandschuIV, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 334-35, 349-50.
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requirement of a criminal predicate for initiating "political activity"
investigations.10 9
Acknowledging that adoption of this modified order "may be
purchased at 'a cost to the values protected by the First Amendment"'
and that "the modification elevator may have descended close to the
constitutional floor," the court granted the motion on the basis that such
a cost was justified due to the "public dangers of terrorism."" 0 The
court's final order incorporated the text of the modified Handschu
Guidelines."'
The adopted modified order also accepted a NYPD proposal that
the 2002 FBI Guidelines become the guidelines governing political
activity investigations." 2 These would then be embedded within the
NYPD Patrol Guide." 3 These guidelines became the "Guidelines for4
Investigations Involving Political Activity" ("NYPD Guidelines")." 1
The NYPD Guidelines apply only when the police are "collecting
information or evidence about political activity in order to investigate
the activity;" thus, the NYPD Guidelines apply only when the NYPD is
acting with an investigative purpose directed towards political
activity." 5 Under these new guidelines, the NYPD can perform
undercover surveillance without any prior approval from an overseeing
authority; the NYPD need only obtain authorization from the Deputy
Commissioner of the Intelligence Division. 16 The only predicates
required for undercover investigations are that the undercover operation
be "the most effective means of obtaining information,"' 1 7 and that there
be "facts or circumstances [which] reasonably indicate that [such]
unlawful [conduct] has been, is being, or will be committed.""' 8 The
NYPD is also authorized to conduct a slightly more limited undercover
surveillance operation for a maximum of 180 days upon the receipt of
information "indicating the possibility of unlawful activity."' 19
109. See id. at 337, 340-42.
110. Id. at 344, 349. "Federal courts may not order States
objection, to undertake a course of conduct not tailored to curing
been adjudicated." Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S.
111. Handschu IV, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
112. Id.at 335,344, 346-47, 349.
113. Id. at 349.
114. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div. (Handschu P), No.
1711775, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2007).
115. Id. at *14.
116. Seeid.at*17.
117. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div. (Handschu VI),
288
2003).
118. Id. at 424.
119. Id. at422-23.
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IV. WATCHING MUSLIMS REDUX:
BELOW THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASEMENT?

The court's conclusion that "the modification elevator" remained
sufficiently elevated above the constitutional basement was, at best,
problematic. 20 But the question now is whether the NYPD has
descended below the constitutional basement in implementing its new
power under the modified Handschu Order.
Any answer to this question must start with the recognition that the
surveillance of the New York region's Muslim communities is based on
religion or ethnic identity. This was discussed earlier.' 21 But as a
reminder, consider, for example, the Intelligence Division's report on the
half-Jewish, half-Muslim Syrian community: "The Demographics Unit
found that the Syrian community in NYC is divided into two parts, a
Jewish Syrian and a Muslim Syrian community .... This
report ...focus[es] on the smaller Muslim community.'' 122 And in a
similar report about Egyptians, the NYPD wrote: "This report does not
an insight into
represent the Coptic Egyptian community, and is merely
23
the Muslim Egyptian community of New York City."'
For the police, this focus makes sense. They have publicized its
logic. In its own 2003 report titled Radicalization in the West: The
Homegrown Threat (the "Report"), the NYPD takes the view that the
major threat to New York City is not from overseas (and there is far less
they can do about this anyway), but rather plots "conceptualized and
planned by 'unremarkable' local residents/citizens who sought to attack
their country of residence, utilizing al-Qaeda as their inspiration and
ideological reference point.' ' 124 The term "unremarkable" has special
meaning in this report; it defines the residents of these communities who
have "'ordinary' jobs, [have] lived 'ordinary' lives and [have] had little,
if any criminal history."'' 25 Among these unremarkable Muslims are
those who experience "a cognitive opening, or crisis, which shakes one's
certitude in previously held beliefs and opens an individual to be
receptive to new worldviews.' 26 This crisis, according to the report,

120. SeeHandschulV,273 F. Supp. 2d 327, 344-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
121. See supra Part III.A.
122. DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, N.Y. POLICE DEP'T, SYRIAN LOCATIONS OF CONCERN REPORT,
availableat http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/documents/nypd/nypd-syria.pdf.
123.

DEMOGRAPHICS UNIT, N.Y. POLICE DEP'T, EGYPTIAN LOCATIONS OF INTEREST REPORT 2

(2006), availableat http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/documents/nypd/nypd-egypt.pdf.
124. SILBER&BHATT, supranote 22, at 5.
125. id. at 6.
126. Id.
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may be economic, social, political, or personal. 127 In short, almost any
kind of conflict or problem might create in an "unremarkable" person a
sense of isolation or alienation that he or she addresses, following the
report's path, through first associating "with like-minded people" and
finding an "identity" in "extremist Islam."' 128 That identification may
then lead these "unremarkable" people to an indoctrination stage of
radicalization in which "this self-selecting group becomes increasingly
important as radical views are encouraged and reinforced., 129 And this
"indoctrination" is the penultimate step to "jihadization"-the
radicalization stage in which the formerly unremarkable members of
society "accept their individual duty to participate in jihad and selfdesignate themselves as holy warriors or mujahedeen."' 130 Upon reaching
this stage of radicalization, the group then will "begin operational
planning for... a terrorist attack." 131 According to the Report, not every
radicalized Muslim will become a terrorist, but all remain dangerous
nonetheless: "Individuals who have been radicalized but are not jihadists
may serve as mentors and agents 32of influence to those who might
become the terrorists of tomorrow.'
This psychological-sociological portrayal of the path from
"unremarkable" community resident to "terrorist" is itself not
remarkable. Its conclusions about the relationship between individual
alienation and social destructiveness is at the center of the work by noted
social psychologist and psychiatrist Erich Fromm on the success of
Nazism, in particular, and of "isms" in general: "modem man still is
anxious and tempted to surrender his freedom to dictators of all kinds or
to lose it by transforming himself into a small cog in the machine,
well
33
fed, and well clothed, yet not a free man but an automaton."'
In describing the NYPD's definition of the radicalization process,
the Report compares it to a funnel: "Entering the process does not mean
one will progress through all four stages and become a terrorist.
However, it also does not mean
that if one doesn't become a terrorist, he
134
threat."'
a
longer
no
is
or she
But what is unique about the NYPD's radicalization report is its
"operationalization." In response to a question posed by Senator Joseph
Lieberman, then NYPD Assistant Commissioner Lawrence Sanchez
127. Id. at 7.
128. Id.at 6-8.
129. Id. at 7.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 10.
133. ERICH FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM, at xii (Avon Books 1965).
134.

SILBER & BHATT, supra note 22, at 10.
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testified before the Senate Homeland Security Committee that "the key
to it was.., to start appreciating what most people would say would be
non-criminal, would be innocuous looking behaviors that could easily be
argued... to be protected by First and Fourth Amendment Rights
''
but... to look across to them as potential precursors to terrorism. 3
Today's surveillance of the region's Muslim communities is the logical
product of the Report's conclusion:
Where once we would have defined the initial indicator of the threat at
the point where a terrorist or group of terrorists would actually plan an
attack, we have now shifted our focus to a much earlier point-a point
where we believe the potential terrorist or group of terrorists begin and
progress through a process 36of radicalization. The culmination of this
process is a terrorist attack.1
Shifting police focus to this earlier point makes perfect police sense
from the perspective of the Report's conclusions. But identifying that
"earlier point" is a tricky business. As the NYPD itself acknowledges,
the alienated "unremarkable" person is basically invisible: "There is no
to predict who
useful profile to assist law enforcement or' 13intelligence
7
will follow this trajectory of radicalization."
This practical uncertainty has been the common theme of the
criticisms of the NYPD's Report or its overall approach. They are
discussed in Faiza Patel's report for the Brennan Center for Justice,
Rethinking Radicalization."' After reviewing the literature on terrorist
psychology, Patel concludes: "In short, government studies and scholars
have repeatedly highlighted the difficulty of predicting which
individuals are likely to commit violent acts. They have cautioned
against viewing radicalization as a 'conveyor belt' that starts with
grievances and 139
ends with violence, with easily discernible signposts
way."'
the
along
The conceded difficulty of determining who will become a Muslim
terrorist is what drives the NYPD to monitor the Muslim community in
the close manner described by the AP stories. 140 If the NYPD cannot

135. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Class Application for Leave to Conduct
Discovery and for a Restraining Order at 6, Handschu v. Special Services Division, No. 71 Civ.
2203 (CSH) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2011).
136.

SILBER & BHATT, supra note 22, at 5.

137. Id. at 8.
138. FAIZA PATEL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RETHINKING RADICALIZATION 8-10 (2011),
available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/f737600b433d98d25e

6pm6beukt.pdf.

139. Id.
at9.
140.

See SILBER & BHATT, supra note 22, at 10; see also supranotes 80-82 and accompanying
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find the unremarkable Muslim, they will watch as many as possible in
hopes of catching a glimpse of one who appears to be traveling along the
route they judge to be leading to committing or aiding in terrorism.
What is the harm? Does this matter? Assuming arguendo that the
NYPD's premise is valid and solid enough to rationally support the
NYPD's intelligence gathering strategies, are there actual consequences
from the implementation of these policies that caution against their
continuation?
One such consequence, as raised by law enforcement scholars and
officials, is that the NYPD's aggressive intelligence efforts have
undermined the community policing efforts that "ha[ve] been the
nation's prevailing policing model,"' 141 to one degree or another, "[s]ince
1
the early 1990s.,, 42
A police chief explained that "the collection of intelligence will
come from the community. So a relationship and confidence with the
[Arab American] community is important... We can't afford to alienate
them. Otherwise, we cut off our sources of information, explained one
police chief."'143 He continued: "[c]ommunity policing is a lot of work,
and when it started it wasn't considered police work. [But] it is
144
prevention.'

This was also the complaint of the FBI agent in charge of the
Bureau's Newark office after the release of the NYPD Report detailing
141. NICOLE J. HENDERSON ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT & ARAB
AMERICAN COMMUNITY RELATIONS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: ENGAGEMENT IN A TIME OF
UNCERTAINTY 6-7 (2006), available at http://www.vera.org/download?file=147/Arab%2B
American%2Bcommunity/o2Brelations.pdf. Community policing as used here is broadly inclusive
of "[a]lmost any activity that increases face-to-face interactions and builds relationships with the
community, such as bike and foot patrols, liaisons with ethnic groups, substations placed in high
crime areas, and working groups and monthly forums, may qualify as a form of community
policing." Id. at 6. Community policing in any form may be on the decline. According to Professor
David Sklansky, "professional policing is mounting a comeback," as seen by increased "sympathy
for the notions that police departments should focus on crime suppression, that they should do so in
ways dictated by objective analysis rather than public whims, and that authority should be
centralized and rationalized." Sklansky, supra note 31, at 2. The federal government seems to
endorse this view, as seen by the decline in support for community policing and the encouragement
of "'intelligence-led policing' and 'predictive policing."' Id. at 3. Intelligence-led policing is an
objective approach to policing that involves the collection and analysis of crime data and
intelligence. Id. This approach "stresses the importance of centralizing much of the handling and
analysis of data above the department level" and employs a "centralized, 'top-down' decisionmaking" model. Id. Similarly, predictive policing "puts intelligence collection and data analysis at
the center of police decision-making." Id. It "refocuses the police on 'fighting crime,' emphasizes
the objective, scientific selection of strategies and tactics, and puts a premium on centralized,
rationalized, bureaucratic decision-making." Id. at 4.
142.

HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 141, at 6.

143. Id. at 17 (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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its investigations in Newark.145 Characterizing the efforts of the NYPD
as fomenting distrust and creating "additional risk [and] blind spots, it
hinders our ability to have our finger on the pulse of what's going on
around the state.' 46
Beyond the question of whether aggressive police surveillance
undermines the efforts to build cooperation with members of New
York's Muslim communities, there is the question of whether the mass
surveillance of New York's Muslim communities causes harm. As a
basic proposition, it seems clear that most Americans would recoil from
the idea that they were being subject to surveillance where, for example,
they worship, work, recreate, or eat solely because of their religion or
their ethnicity. Americans have expressed concern for their civil liberties
in polls.' 47 In the year following 9/11, 49% of respondents believed that
the First Amendment "goes too far in the rights it guarantees,' 48 but this
percentage plummeted to 23% just three years later in 2005.149 When
asked if they would be willing to forego certain civil liberties in order to
prevent terrorism, 55% of Americans favored protecting civil liberties.' 50
This same result was found in a second study concluding that a majority
of Americans favor protecting their civil liberties over limiting those
liberties to curb terrorism.' 51 But polls also show that if the question is
whether the police should watch the Muslim communities in this same
way, the answer is a resounding yes.' For example, a 2002 national
poll by the First Amendment Center found that 42% of Americans
agreed with the proposition that "government should have more power
to monitor Muslims than others.' 53 A Cornell University study
performed in 2004 found that 44% of respondents believed that "some

145.

See Al Baker, F.B.I Official Faults Police Tactics by the Police on Muslims, N.Y. TIMES,

Mar. 8, 2012, at A25.
146. Id.
147. See, e.g., FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., STATE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT SURVEY 2005, at 3
(2005), available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/madison/wp-content/uploads/2011/03
/SOFA2005.pdf (discussing the decline in respondents who believed that the first amendment was

over-inclusive).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Darren W. Davis & Brian D. Silver, Civil Liberties vs. Security in the Context of the
TerroristAttacks on America, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 28,33 tbl.1 (2004).
151. INST. FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND Soc. RESEARCH, POLICY BRIEF: AMERICANS PROTECT
CIVIL LIBERTIES
4
(2002),
available at http://ippsr.msu.edu/Documents/PolicyBrief/

911 Briefing.pdf.
152.

See Islamophobia, COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, http://www.cair.com

/Issues/Islamophobia/Islamophobia.aspx (last visited July 27, 2012) [hereinafter CA1R]; Ken
Paulson, Too Free?, AM. JOURNALISM REV. (Sept. 2002), http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=262 1.
153.

Paulson, supra note 152.
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' 54
curtailment of civil liberties is necessary for Muslim Americans."'
More recently, a Quinnipiac University poll released in March 2012,
soon after the considerable publicity and criticisms of the NYPD's
surveillance of the region's Muslim communities, showed that 58% of
New Yorkers believe that the police have not "unfairly targeted
156
Muslims,' 155 but have "acted appropriately" in dealing with Muslims.
A 2011 Harris Poll found that 86% of respondents were57 in favor of
increasing undercover surveillance of suspected terrorists. 1
Most members of the Muslim communities react as most
Americans would if they were being spied on-they do not like it. And
they like it less, no doubt, because the singular attention on Muslim
Americans as potential purveyors of terror denigrates them in the eyes of
other Americans and challenge their own self-identities. 158 Polls since
9/11 have shown consistent skepticism towards Muslims by large
segments of the American population. 159 A 2006 USA Today headline
vividly makes this point: "USA's Muslims Under a Cloud," which is
followed by a story that reports on a USA Today/Gallup Poll's findings
showing "strong anti-Muslim feeling" throughout the country. 160
According to this poll, 39% of respondents believed that Muslim
Americans should be required to carry special identification "as a means
of preventing terrorist attacks in the United States."' 16 1 One-third said
that Muslim Americans were "sympathetic to al-Qaeda."' 162 In that same
year, an ABC News poll found that nearly "46 percent of Americans
expressed a generally unfavorable opinion of Islam."' 163 These levels
have not changed since then. 164 In a 2010 New York Times poll, 33% of
respondents believed that Muslims were "more sympathetic to terrorists"

154. CAIR, supra note 152.
155. New Yorkers Say 2-1 Cops Treat Muslims Fairly, Quinnipiac University Poll Finds;
Strong Approval for NYPD, Kelly, Bloomberg On Crime, QU1NNIPIAC UNIV. POLL
(Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/institutes-and-centers/polling-institute/new-york1
city/release-detail?ReleaselD= 716 [hereinafter QUINNIPIAC POLL March 13].
156. Id.
157. See Ten Years Later, a Look at Safety, Possible Terror Attacks, and Security After 9/11,
HARRIS INTERACTIVE (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls

/tabid/447/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/mid/1508/ArticleId/857/Default.aspx

[hereinafter

HARRIS

POLL].

158. Marilyn Elias, USA's Muslims Under a Cloud, USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/
news/nation/2006-08-09-muslim-american-coverx.htm (last updated Aug. 10, 2006).
159.

See id; QUINNIPIAC POLL March 13, supra note 155.

160. Elias, supranote 158.
161. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. Id
163. Jon Cohen, Poll: Americans Skeptical ofIslam and Arabs, ABC NEWS (Mar. 8, 2006),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id= 700599.
164. See Editorial, Mistrust and the Mosque, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2010, at A20.
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than other citizens, a figure which was consistent with polls taken after
9/11.165

Additionally, the percentage of hate crimes motivated by an antiIslamic bias, which spiked to 27.2% right after 9/11, has continued at
high rates since then. 166 For example, in 2004, the percentage of hate
crimes motivated by anti-Islamic bias went down to 12.7%, 167 but has
stayed within five percentage points, reaching a low of 7.7% in 2008168
and a high of 13.2% in 2010.169 As a result, Arab Americans and Muslim
Americans have been harmed not only in their person and property, but
have also been harmed psychologically. The Vera Report found that
Arab Americans throughout the country, as a result of varying degrees of
surveillance, had "an increased sense of being victimized and harassed;
heightened suspicion of government and law enforcement; anxiety about
their place in American society ...and concerns about protecting their
civil liberties. 1 70 In fact, various reports by psychologists have indicated
growing negative psychological effects, such as anxiety, depression, and
post-traumatic stress disorder.'
Muslims have been called "doubly
traumatized;" once as a result of the 9/11 attacks, and twice because of
the anti-Muslim discrimination and violence.' 72 Overall, one-third of
Arab Americans report being a victim of ethnic-based discrimination at
some point in their lives and "[o]ne-fifth experienced such
discrimination after September 11.,, 73 According to the FBI, "antiMuslim crimes increased by 1,700% during 2001,'074 and, according to
the Council on American Islamic Relations, anti-Muslim acts have

165. Id.
166. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HATE CRIME STATISTICS, 2001, at i, 5 (2001), available
at http:/lwww.fbi.govlabout-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2001.
167. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HATE CRIME STATISTICS, 2004, at 6 (2004), available at

http://www.fbi.gov/about-uslcjis/ucr/hate-crime/2004.
168.

FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HATE CRIME STATISTICS, 2008: INCIDENTS AND

OFFENSES, 2008, at 3
incidentsandoffenses.pdf.
169.

(2008),

available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2008/documents/

FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HATE CRIME STATISTICS, 2010: INCIDENTS AND

OFFENSES, 2010, at 2 (2010) [hereinafter FBI 2010 STATISTICS], available at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-andoffenses.pdf.
170. HENDERSON ETAL., supranote 141, at 10.
171.

Rebecca A. Clay, Muslims in America, Post 9/11,AM. PSYCH. ASSOC. (Sept. 2011),

http://www.apa.org/monitor/2011/09/muslims.aspx.
172. Id.
173. Mona M. Amer, Arab American Mental Health in the Post September 11 Era:
Acculturation, Stress, and Coping 46 (May 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Toledo), available at http://etd.ohiolink.edu/view.cgi?acc num--toledoI 115395141.
174. Mona M. Amer & Joseph D. Hovey, Anxiety and Depression in a Post-September 11
Sample ofArabs in the USA, 47 SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 409,410 (2012).
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increased each year since 2001.75 It is important to note that these are
the very perceptions that the NYPD, in their report on homegrown
terrorism, points to as fundamental to radicalization176
Many Arab Americans fear that the U.S. government will gain "the
power to arrest persons without due process and even deport them to
their country of origin for further interrogation."' 77 Additionally, Arab
Americans fear that they eventually "will be essentially under 'house
arrest' with every aspect of their personal and professional lives
monitored."' 178 In order to prove their loyalty to the United States and to
distance themselves from the terrorist stereotype, many Arab Americans
have "felt the need to denounce the very culture and religion that they
were raised in, stirring a 79
great deal of psychological distress regarding
identities."
their personal
V.

THE MADISON DILEMMA: WHAT CAN BE DONE?

Presuming from the above discussion that surveillance of the New
York region's Muslim communities goes beyond the limits of
constitutionally legitimate policing and causes harms, but at the same
time is supported by the public, what can be done to rein it in? Jefferson
saw a bill of rights as an answer to such a question. 80 Madison, at least
initially, thought that a bill of rights would only create a false
expectation that such rights could be protected against democratic
passions.' 8' Certainly his observation concerning the connection
between democracy and civil rights in times of public stress has proven
prescient throughout American history. Its wisdom is currently
evidenced by the responses of important N.Y. political figures to the
NYPD's surveillance of Muslim communities. Most have remained
noticeably silent, but two with direct power over the NYPD have been
proponents of its methods. 182 Mayor Michael Bloomberg, although
strongly in favor of the establishment of a controversial mosque near the
9/11 site, has repeated the NYPD's refrain: "Everything the New York
City Police Department has done is legal, it is appropriate, it is

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
Amer, supra note 173, at 47.
Id.
Id. at48.
WOOD, supranote 2, at 67.

181.

See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 THE PAPERS

OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supranote 11, at 19.

182. See infra notes 185-86.
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constitutional.' 1 83 N.Y. City Council Speaker Christine Quinn has
essentially mirrored the Mayor's remarks: "Unless we know that laws
were broken or someone's civil liberties were violated, I do not think the
NYPD should stop the practice [of monitoring Muslims].' 8 4
On the other hand, a significant number of City Council members
185
have opposed this view and are considering legislation to change it.
Also, Attorney General Eric Holder has begun reviewing the NYPD's
surveillance practices' 8 6 and a number of members of Congress have
expressed concern. 187 Perhaps it was the distance from 9/11 or the
information provided in the AP investigatory reports, but now there is a
growing willingness of some members of the City Council and groups
such as the Brennan Center for Justice and the New York Civil Liberties
Union to push back politically against the NYPD's surveillance strategy
through the introduction of legislation establishing an NYPD inspector
general with authority to review surveillance strategies such as those
described herein. While such legislation does not draw lines for the
NYPD, it does provide an independent monitor of NYPD conduct who
would have the power to cabin overly broad or religiously based police
surveillance.
What about the courts? They are often seen as the forum in which
unpopular views are vindicated by an independent judiciary. Whatever
role the courts have played historically in maintaining America's
democracy, there have been moments when they have not furthered
America's constitutional principles. Examples of this are the Supreme
Court's decision to uphold the constitutionality of the Espionage Act of
1918188 and its decision to validate the relocation of Japanese Americans
in 1941."9 Significantly, these decisions were often rendered during
183. Michael Barbaro, Mayor's Stance on Muslim Center Has Deep Roots, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
13, 2010, at Al; Mirela Iverac, Bloomberg: NYPD's Monitoring of Muslims Was Legal, WNYC

NEWS (Feb. 24, 2012 1:03 P.M.), http://www.wnyc.org/blogs/wnyc-news-blog/2012/feb/24/
bloomberg-nypds-monitoring-muslims-was-legal/.
184.

Michael Howard Saul, Speaker Quinn Voices Support for NYPD Monitoring of Muslims,

WALL ST. J.(Feb. 27, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2012/02/27/speaker-quinn-voicessupport-for-nypd-monitoring-of-muslims/.
185.

See, e.g., Brad Lander, NYPD Surveillance: What We Don't Know, and Why It Matters,

HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 15, 2012, 10:19 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.comlbrad-lander/nypdsurveillance-oversight b 1347173.html (discussing Councilmember Brad Lander's criticism of
NYPD surveillance practices and his work on legislation to create an NYPD Inspector General as an
"independent voice, focusing on how police policies square with civil liberties").
186.
187.

Police Powers, supra note 32.
Adam Goldman, NYPD Muslim Spying: House Democrats Slam Mayor Bloomberg Over

'Unprofessional' Response, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 2, 2012, 3:36 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2012/04/02/nypd-muslim-spying-house-democrats-mayor-bloombergn- 1397400.html.
188. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 616-17, 624 (1919).
189. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1944).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol40/iss3/4

24

Lane: On Madison, Muslims, and the New York City Police Department

2012]

ON MADISON, MUSLIMS, AND THE NYPD

times of social stress, 190 one of which could coincide with the stressor of
the current war against terrorism. The 2003 decision of the District Court
to modify the Handschu Guidelines also falls into that category.1 9'
Should the NYPD's surveillance of the New York region's Muslim
communities be brought to the attention of the judiciary, there would
likely be the potential for bringing a strong claim that this practice
violates the equal protection clauses of both the U.S. Constitution and
the N.Y. Constitution. 92 The essence of this claim is that religion alone
drives the NYPD's anti-terrorist surveillance of the New York region's
Muslim communities. And the effect is "religious gerrymander[ing]" by
193
the NYPD in New York City and in the New York City region.
Despite police claims to the contrary, their response is essentially always
the same. "Leads" take them to Muslim communities. But these leads,
defined as the "possibility of unlawful conduct,"' 194 are grounded in the
NYPD's determination that finding "unremarkable" Muslims who may
become jihadists is the best way to prevent terrorism. 195 That may be
true, but the identifier "unremarkable" leaves the police with religion as
the only traceable marker. Such intentional use of religion as an
identifying characteristic, as evidenced by the above-described language
and conduct 96of the NYPD, makes the NYPD intentionally
discriminatory.1
190. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 617 (stating that the charges against the defendants occurred at a
time when the United States was at war with the Imperial German Government); Korematsu, 323
U.S. at 223 (stating that Korematsu was excluded from the Military Area because the United States
was at war with the Japanese Empire and feared an invasion from the West Coast).
191. Handschu IV, 273 F. Supp. 2d 327, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that the Handschu
Guidelines would need to be reconsidered in light of the events of 9/11 and the emergence of
terrorism).
192. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. Article 1, Section 11 of the New York State Constitution provides that:
[n]o person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any
subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be
subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights by any other person or by any
firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11. Since the Equal Protection Clause of the N.Y. Constitution does not seem
to afford any greater protections than that of the U.S. Constitution, analysis of the NYPD's
surveillance is the same under both the state and federal equal protection clauses. See Dorsey v.
Stuyvesant Town Corp., 87 N.E.2d 541, 542, 548 (N.Y. 1949) (holding that Stuyvesant Town
Corporation's practice of excluding blacks as tenants received the same analysis under both the
N.Y. and federal constitutions).
193. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n. of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
194. Handschu VI, 288 F. Supp. 2d411,422 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
195. SILBER & BHATr, supra note 22, at 6.
196. Federal Equal Protection jurisprudence requires intentional discrimination, evidenced by
expressly discriminatory language, neutral language and intentionally discriminatory conduct, or
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The instant facts are unlike those presented in the problematic case
of Brown v. City of Oneonta,197 in which police questioned all black men
who attended the State University of New York College at Oneonta and
nearly all of the black male residents of Oneonta. 198 In Brown, an elderly
woman was attacked and identified her attacker as a young black male
with a cut on his arm. 199 In its decision dismissing the various civil rights
claims, the circuit court held that the use of race as a defining
characteristic did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the
police were seeking out a specific individual known to have committed a
crime and their questioning of all black men was based on a description
of the alleged perpetrator. 00 This is in sharp contrast to the NYPD's
practice of surveilling all Muslims-not a particular individual-with
religion as the sole distinguishing characteristic, regardless of whether a
crime has been committed.
Is the NYPD's surveillance strategy for Muslim communities and
its implementation "immediately suspect?" The Supreme Court noted in
Korematsu that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect," but has not yet spoken
directly to the question of whether the highest standard protects a single
religion from state discrimination.20 ' It is hard to imagine that the answer
would not be the same, although a particular religion, unlike for example
a particular race, is not a human characteristic.
For example, in United States v. Armstrong,20 2 involving an
unsuccessful challenge to prosecutorial discretion, the Court did conjoin
"race" and "religion," warning that the exercise of such discretion on the
basis of either may be an "unjustifiable standard., 20 3 The Court has
further explained that, "[a] defendant may demonstrate that the
administration of a criminal law is 'directed so exclusively against a
particular class of persons.., with a mind so unequal and oppressive'
amounts to 'a practical denial' of equal
that the system of prosecution
20 4
law."
the
of
protection
neutral language adopted for discriminatory reasons that have a discriminatory

effect. See

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (rejecting disproportionate impact as tantamount to
discriminatory intent); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 487-88, 495 (1954) (rejecting a
facially discriminatory policy); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (rejecting a
facially neutral policy with discriminatory intent).

197. 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000).
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 334.
Id.
Id. at 333-34.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
517 U.S. 456 (1996).
Id. at 464, 470.
Id. at 464-65 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886)).
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Establishment clause jurisprudence supports the same conclusion.
In Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,20 5 the Court held that
a state's "infringements must be subjected to strict scrutiny and could be
20 6
justified only by proof by the State of a compelling interest."
Defending a law that denied unemployment benefits as a result of the
plaintiff's Sabbath required a state to satisfy the highest level of scrutiny,
not just "the barest level of minimal scrutiny that the Equal Protection
Clause already provides. 2 °7
Despite this helpful language, the claim here needs to be broader
than one brought under the Establishment Clause, at least to the extent
that this jurisprudence can reach only interference with the actual
practice of religion rather than interference in the life of a particular
religious group.
Assuming a classification based on religion triggers strict scrutiny,
the state can still argue that its surveillance policy serves a substantial
governmental interest, 2°8 or, as in Korematsu, a "[p]ressing public
necessity, ' 2°9 and that this policy is the least restrictive means of
achieving that interest. 210 Again, using the arguments of racial
discrimination, that interest cannot be religious antagonism. In
Korematsu, the "pressing public necessity" that justified the disputed
racially disparate treatment was the falsely stated "apprehension by the
authorities of the gravest imminent danger to the public
proper military
21 1
safety.",
In the instant case, it appears clear that the NYPD surveillance
strategy is based on the religious beliefs of the watched communities,
thereby triggering strict scrutiny review. That said, it would be difficult
to argue that the protection of the public from acts of terrorism in post9/11 New York City is not a "pressing public necessity," leaving open
the question of whether the strategy itself is narrowly tailored.2t 2 That
205. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
206. Id.at 141.
at 138-39, 141-42 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 727 (1986) (O'Connor, J.
207. See id.
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
208. See SILBER & BHATT, supra note 22, at 10.
209. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
210. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488,490 (1960).
211. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218.
212. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 351 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[T]he lesson of Korematsu is that national security constitutes a 'pressing
public necessity,' though the government's use of race to advance that objective must be narrowly
tailored."); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 94-95, 104-105 (1943) (upholding a
curfew for people of Japanese ancestry because the Court found that "the danger of espionage and
sabotage to our military resources was imminent, and.., the curfew order was an appropriate

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2012

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:689

strategy, to repeat, is to watch Muslims in what the NYPD characterizes
as public spaces; to search for "unremarkable" Muslims before a crime
is committed.21 3 This would seem impossibly broad and constitutionally
unjustifiable.214 As demonstrated by the police practices themselves,
alternatives do exist. Take for example the case of Jose Pimentel,
arrested on November 19, 2011.215 The NYPD had been tracking him for
nearly two years, but only after he was known to have an interest in
jihad.21 6 This knowledge was the result of a notification from a
Schenectady-area police department.2 17 Schenectady police knew of
Pimentel because of his arrest for stealing credit card information,
reports of domestic violence in 2008, and three outstanding warrants for
unpaid alimony. 1 8 Pimentel's "fascination with Islam" was known to
the local police because he was very upfront about his "radical views"
and maintained a Web page detailing his beliefs and bomb-making
methods. 2 9 Even before Pimentel relocated to Manhattan, Schenectady
police notified the NYPD of Pimentel.22 ° Once Pimentel was living in
Manhattan, he was subject to surveillance and a police informant.2 21
Pimentel's arrest does not justify the NYPD surveillance practices,
however. Instead, it emphasizes the argument of this Article: tracking an
identified individual Muslim, such as Pimentel, for a legitimate reason is
within the ambit of constitutional policing, but surveilling all Muslims
based solely on their religious beliefs is a violation of their constitutional
rights.

measure to meet it").
213. See supratext accompanying notes 194-96.
214. Cf NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1964) (quoting Bates v.
City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960)) (finding that the freedom of association is protected
from "governmental interference" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v.
Minn. Dep't of Transp., 345 F.3d 964, 972-74 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the Disadvantaged
Business Enterprises program was narrowly tailored because "race-neutral means" were used to the
greatest extent possible and because race was relevant, but was "not a determinative factor").
215. Joseph Goldstein & William K. Rashbaum, City Bomb Plot Suspect Is Called Fan of
Qaeda Cleric, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2011, at Al.
216. Michael Mukasey, NYPD True: Michael Mukasey on Why New York's Secret Terror
Fighters Deserve Our Praise, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec.
11, 2011,
6:00 AM),

http://www.nydailynews.com/nopinion/nypd-true-michael-mukasey-york-secret-terror-fightersdeserve-praise-article- 1.989430.
217. John Mueller, Case 48: Pimentel's Pipe Bomb, in TERRORISM SINCE 9/11: THE
AMERICAN CASES 1, 2 (John Mueller ed., 2012) [hereinafter PIMENTEL CASE STUDY], available at

http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/j mueller/SINCE.pdf.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 1-2; Goldstein & Rashbaum, supra note 215.
PIMENTEL CASE STUDY, supranote 217, at 2.

221.

Id.
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A major hurdle to any equal protection suit is standing.222 A
plaintiff must establish that he or she has been "'personally denied equal
treatment' by the challenged discriminatory conduct., 223 The injury
claimed may be a stigma imposed by the discriminatory conduct.224
Under existing law, though, when claiming an injury of stigma, the
stigma alone is insufficient; there must be "stigma-plus. 22 5 The stigma,
or taint to one's name or reputation, must be accompanied by an injury
to a tangible interest or legal right. 22 6 In the past, examples of such an
injury have been the "loss of employment or the foreclosure of future
employment opportunities. 227
The type of injuries that Muslims generally have suffered is to their
religious identity.228 Reportedly, the stigmatization that is a consequence
of continuous police surveillance has had harmful emotional and
psychological effects on many Muslim individuals.229 And the "terrorist
stereotype" imposed by the NYPD's surveillance has led some Muslims
to denounce their religion and culture. 230 These individuals have also felt
increased anxiety because of concern for their civil liberties and fear of
the police, the very people intended to serve and protect. 23I These
psychological effects are in addition to the physical violence that has
plagued many Arab Americans since 9/11.232 It would seem that such
claims individually particularized could be the basis for standing.
Additionally, take as an example of economic harm the case of
Mousa Ahmad, whose story was detailed by the Ap.233 Ahmad was
forced to close his cafd in a Moroccan community because a stigma
imposed by an alleged surveillance operation caused business to
decline. 234 Neighbors met with the local police commander in Ahmad's
restaurant to complain about a man who sat on a nearby park bench for
hours each day.235 The commander did not confirm the existence of a

222. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984).
223. Id.(quoting Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984)).
224. Id.at 754.
225. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 699, 701 (1976).
226. See id. at 701.
227. See In re Lee TT v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1249 (N.Y. 1996).
228. See Amer, supranote 173, at 48, 60.
229. Amer & Hovey, supra note 174, at 415; Chris Hawley, Law May Not Be on Muslims' Side
in NYPD Intel Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 8, 2011, available at http://www.ap.org/
Content/AP-In-The-News/20 11 /Law-may-not-be-on-Muslims-side-in-NYPD intel-case.
230. See Amer, supranote 173, at 48.
231. HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 141, at 10.
232. See FBI 2010 STATISTICS, supra note 169.
233. Hawley, supra note 229.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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surveillance investigation, but the inference of surveillance and
the
36
ensuing taint to Ahmad's caf6 was enough to drive business away.
Vt.

CONCLUSION

Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no
constitution, no law, no court can save it, no constitution, no law, no
court can even do much
to help it.
237
- LearnedHand
As New Yorkers enter the 2013 election cycle for City officials, the
surveillance of New York's Muslims will continues despite revelations
of its breadth and depth. Pending legislation for an NYPD inspector
general with the power to end or limit such surveillance will not pass if
such authority is vested in an individual outside of the NYPD's control.
And any law suit challenging surveillance authority will indubitably
stumble. This would have been James Madison's prediction and history
has shown the prescience of his thinking. The surveillance of New
York's Muslim communities by the NYPD is not surprising. The public
is rightly concerned about terrorism and the NYPD has offered a
narrative for its protection: homegrown terrorism is a real threat; it starts
with unremarkable Muslims; we must watch them. Through this
approach the NYPD believes that it is doing everything it can to prevent
another attack and escape criticism if one occurs. And there is no
challenge to this view. Significant numbers of elected officials accept
the NYPD's story because it is what their constituents believe, it is
easier in cases such as this to follow rather than lead, and because they,
like the public, are civically uneducated.23 8 Only the far outnumbered
Muslims, their elected officials, and several good government groups
complain. Only reduced public anxiety and education (or a growing
Muslim population) will change this formula. Or perhaps a reduction of
national insecurity over the war on terrorism will allow the U.S.
Attorney General to assert some authority over the NYPD's surveillance
strategy. In any event in an age of an ongoing war against terrorism (and
declining civic education) it is clear that the security concerns of the
many will outweigh the freedom concerns of the few. That is Madison's
message to Jefferson and to us.

236. Id.
237. Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty (1944), in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 190, 190 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1963).
238. See Eric Lane & Meg Barnette, A Report Card on New York's Civic Literacy, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, at 1,21 (2011), http://brennan.3cdn.net/e9502c45a124420af3_rlm6beqp3.pdf.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol40/iss3/4

30

